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PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
IN NORTH AMERICA
Michael E. Mannt
U.S. Speaker
I have 20 minutes to say what will preserve the integrity of the
financial markets of North America. It is somewhat of a daunting task. I
guess my disclaimer should be that I spent most of my life as a regulator and
so I was always certain. Now that I am a defense lawyer, I spend most of my
life explaining why things are not as clear as they seem to be. I think that is
really an important starting point for what I want to talk about in terms of the
integrity of the financial markets in North America.
The success of the American market is based in large part on the premise
that you can actually sell integrity. The high quality of the U.S. markets is
based on the integrity of its participants, of its issuers, and on the fact that
there is a regulatory system that is reasonably fair, reasonably predictable,
and reasonably responsive to the problems that are encountered on a
day-to-day and year-to-year basis. This system has created enormous
demand for the American markets. Now, you are probably all sitting there
asking, "Didn't he hear about Enron?" The answer is, yes. I have heard about
Enron. '
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1 The Fall of Enron: Report details Enron's deception; Examiner cites auditors,
lawyers and banks as part of scheme, HOus. CHRON., March 6, 2003, at 1, available at
2003 WL 3242126.
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ENRON
However, Enron is one of those things that needs to be responded to,
because unlike John and while I am not sure that you said this I will attribute
it to you anyway, principle based regulation would not have stopped Enron.
2
Principle based regulation would not have stopped World Com. Those were
frauds. Those were bad guys doing bad things. The day that your books close
and you add a receivable for $4 billion, somebody should notice. You do not
need a principle to tell them to notice these things. They should clearly
notice.
If you have on your books an item that you paid $120 million for that is
non-operable, has no staff added, is based in a country like India, then
somebody ought to go look at it before it is transferred to a separate vehicle
that is valued at $150 million. These were failures, and they were failures of
the system, failures of the accountants, failures of the Boards of Directors,
and failures of the regulators.3
REGULATION
The fact is the most successful markets in the world, the markets in North
America, attract the best investors, the best companies, the best
professionals, but they also attract the best scoundrels. I think what we are
seeing today, approaching the end of a boom cycle where there was
enormous pressure brought to bear on the market by a desire to do better and
better and better, and not to admit failure and ultimately not to see failure for
what it was. That is something that has been dealt with and I will talk about
this more later when we touch on Sarbanes-Oxley.4 But it is not something
that goes to what to me is the most critical question: do you have a regulatory
scheme that can work and that will provide you value and protect as well as
preserve the integrity of the financial markets in North America?
When thinking about this, I was reminded of a couple of dealings I had
while at the Security and Exchange Commission. I would often go over to
Germany and talk to the German regulators about their approach to the fact
that they had no insider trading law and the fact that they really did not have
much of a market regulatory approach. 5 The German's would say to me,
2 The regulator who isn't there, THE ECONOMIST, May 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL
7246206.
3 The amazing disintegratingfirm - Enron; The tragedy of one company's rise and fall,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7320993.
4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act), PUB.L. 107-204, July 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 745.
5 Hans-Bernd Schifer & Claus Ott, Economic Effects of EEC Insider Trading Regulation
Applied to Germany, 12 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 357, 358-60 (1992). On July 26, 1994
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"You know, we have looked at the evidence. Last year, you guys brought 60
insider trading cases. We brought none. What is the problem? We have no
problem here." I said to them, "Well, you know, you do not have a law
against insider trading. You do not prosecute insider trading. We do." They
would respond by arguing that they did not need insider trading laws because
they did not have insider trading.
It is clear that from this example that obviously they did not know what
they had. In the United States, we did. The fact that we went after it showed a
desire to try to clean up what was a problem. It was a problem and I think it
is important to have those problems out there. But in Germany, there were no
public investors. Why? All you have to do is walk down the street and ask,
"Would you invest in the securities of any company?" They would say no.
When you ask why, they would tell you that the banks have all the
information and they are the ones who are trading the stock. I have nothing.
That is really the critical point. How do you get information out, and how do
you get information out to investors so investors believe it?
We have a crisis today. The issue is how do we stem that crisis, not is the
regulation bad. Often we have seen in other markets where crisis exists an
attempt at a new regulatory scheme, writing of a new rulebook, changes in
the way we regulate, or even considering the option of not having
self-regulation. My approach would be to say what we have is a good
regulatory scheme, but it needs modification. It needs to be updated.
Regulation needs to be as dynamic as the business that it regulates. The thing
that is most obvious from the examples of the 1990's, both good and bad, is
that the markets in North America are incredibly vital. They are
incredibly dynamic. The regulator needs to be equally dynamic, as does the
regulation.
What I want to do is talk a little bit about history and the future;
challenges to integrity that the SEC has seen in the past and what it is
confronting today. The one in the past I want to talk about is the one I know
best, the problem created by internationalization. With regards to the future, I
am not going to go through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act since I am sure you have
all studied that paper. Rather I will focus on how Sarbanes-Oxley creates
new responsibilities for gatekeepers. It designates people as gatekeepers in a
way that they have never been designated before. It says you are responsible
not just for what you say, but for the truth of what you say. It also says you
have got to sign a certification that what you say is true. That is the portion
that makes a difference, the penalty of prosecution for that signature if it
turns out to be false.
Germany adopted regulations dealing with insider trading and created a federal securities
commission.
2003]
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
The challenge for today is for regulators to figure out how to apply this
statute, not just in the United States, but internationally. Before we get to
that, let me talk a little bit about the 1980's and internationalization. In the
1980's, the issues that were confronted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission dealt with maintaining the integrity of the trading markets. All
of a sudden, you had markets that had always been very much domestic
markets, Americans trading on the American market, becoming
internationalized. You had the large universal banks moving into the United
States and buying broker dealers. You had enormous interest in securities as
an investment for internationalizing a portfolio. The result of that was you
had insider trading from abroad. You had market manipulation from abroad.
You had securities that were trading in multiple markets and this was a
phenomenon that nobody understood.
You also had something else going on, which is a desire on the U.S.
market side to no longer be a domestic issuing market. There was an
enormous competition at that time between the United States and Great
Britain to see who would be the greatest market in the world as a financial
issuing market. The British in 1989 had 550 companies listed in trading from
outside of their borders. The United States had about 450, 350 of which were
Canadians. There was enormous pressure at the SEC to try to figure out on
the one hand what to do about the fraud that was occurring on the market and
on the other hand how to open the markets. With the open markets issue
came the pressure to have more issuance and really increase the prospects for
the American marketplace.
The principle that the SEC hit on, was one that grew out of an
enforcement case.6 And that is a very simple one: if you play in our
markets, you play by our rules. Sounds like a perfectly reasonable thing. Got
to be somewhat of a confrontation when Swiss banks started trading, and the
SEC started asking who their customers were. They said, "There is the Swiss
law. We cannot tell you, you know, secret." The SEC's position was
basically you are trading here. Our law trumps your law. This issue went to
Court, not surprisingly, an American Court agreed with the SEC.7 Shortly
after that, a number of colleagues and I wrote a paper called Waiver By
6 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111
(Nov 16, 1981).
7 "It would be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American
markets, violate American laws if they were indeed violated, withdraw profits and resist
accountability for itself and its principals for the illegality by claiming their anonymity under
foreign law." Id. at 119.
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Conduct, which I think is when I first met Michael Robinson.8 A large
number of people thought that we had lost our minds in the extraterritorial
assertion of American Law.9 However, all we did was say what the U.S.
Court had already said to us. What grew out of Waiver By Conduct, which
we clearly know was both provocative and extraterritorial, was that everyone
came forward and said negotiate. We can work this out. Our laws may be
different, but this is not impossible. This can be worked out by mutual
understanding and that is exactly what the SEC did.
The SEC decided that the waiver policy was not going to work, because
the cost of every litigation was tens of thousands of dollars, or probably
today it would be hundreds of thousands of dollars. It was incredibly slow,
even when the SEC was pushing it. Not to mention it was hard to say you
were very effective if you had to go after everybody in the world you had a
question about, knowing that only 10 percent or so of those people were
going to turn out to have done something wrong. The SEC was never going
to have the resources to do it.
AGREEMENTS WITH CANADA
In 1988 the SEC, starting with the Canadian securities regulators,
negotiated their First Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation.' 0
That Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was the basis on which all
cooperation between the United States and the Canadian Provinces took
place. It was signed by Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia but all of the
other Provinces of Canada have agreed to work under its terms. What is
interesting is that in the United States only one law needed to be changed to
make it work. We had to modify the Exchange Act to give the SEC the
power to cooperate with foreign authorities and to gather evidence using
subpoena powers." 1 In Canada, every provincial law in the country had to be
changed.'2 The United States could have made it an executive agreement or
8 Concept Release Requesting Comments Concerning a Concept To Improve the
Commission's Ability To Investigate and Prosecute Persons Who Purchase or Sell Securities
in the U.S. Markets From Other Countries 31 S.E.C. Docket 14, Release No. 34-21186, (July
30, 1984), available at 1984 WL 559194; Notice of Issuance of Concept Release and Request
for Comments, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1305 (Aug. 3, 1984).
9 Brian L. Nelson, Insider Trading Originating Abroad and "Waiver-By-Conduct, " 19
INT'L LAW. 817 (1985).
10 Memorandum of Understanding United States Securities and Exchange Commission and
Ontario Securities Commission, Quebec Security and Exchange Commission, British
Columbia Securities Commission (Jan. 7, 1988), reproduced at 21 Sec. Crimes Appendix 28
(2003).
11 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, PUB. L. No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677.
12 See, Saskatchewan Statutes; The Securities Act, 1988, S.S. 1988-89, c. S-42.2, S.S.
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even potentially a treaty. That would be very difficult for Ontario, possibly
Quebec. The idea of the MOU's is something that was also applied to the
issuing markets and was to open dialogues with countries.
The Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) that was established
between the United States and Canada was based on the idea that mutual
recognition is too hard, our systems are too hard to reconcile, even between
Canada and the United States.' 3 Instead of having both sides saying lets not
try, we created a basis for recognizing that we can put this together. It was a
very common sense approach to what is a problem that everyone in the world
spends an enormous amount of time on today. When you look at what is
going on in the accounting area, I think you will see there are a lot of reasons
to look not for mutual recognition, but to look at employing an MJDS model.
These markets grew enormously and this growth was in large part
because of the phenomenon of cooperation; cooperation that has gone along
very well for the last 20 years. The failure of Enron, the failure of Andersen,
the failures of companies in the United States and outside the United States,
on the basis of accounting misdeeds are something that really has created a
new problem. As I have been saying all along, this is a new problem that
regulation needs to solve.
Acronyms like GAAP and GAS and the FASB and IASB are things that
are surprisingly part of the vernacular. 14 I was talking to my 11 year old,
debating with her about how much money she had in her savings account.
She claimed it was a factor of ten greater than I did and demanded a
restatement when I told her that I was not going to give it to her. She really
knew what was going on. She had been reading the papers. And people know
what Sarbanes-Oxley is, as well. It is an attempt to bring the accounting for
corporations in the United States into a new world where information is
made available in an understandable way and where it is tested in a clearer
way. I think that it fits well within the framework that already exists in the
United States.
There was an enormous debate when Sarbanes-Oxley was first proposed
and then again when it was passed, about whether it went too far. I am on
both sides of this fence. On the one hand, if anybody has ever read the
1988-89, c. S-42.2, as am. S.S. 1989, c. 15, s. 3 amend in 1988 and 1989; Quebec Statutes;
Securities Act; S.Q. 1982, c. V-1.1, c. 21, s. 134; c. 64, ss. 561-563; c. 84, s. 700(16) amended
in 1988; Nova Scotia Statutes; Securities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 418, s. 150; Manitoba
Statutes; The Securities Act; Part XI, Insider Trading; R.S.M. 1988, c. S50, s. 108; 108;
Newfoundland and Labrador Statutes; Securities Act; Part XX, Insider Trading and
Self-Dealing; R.S.N. 1990, c. S-13, s. 107-121.
13 Securities Act Release No. 6841, 44 SEC Docket (CCH), at 56-57 (July 24, 1989).
14 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); General Accounting Standards
(GAS); Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB); International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB).
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Exchange Act of 1934,15 which established the United States SEC, you will
notice that there is no other country in the world, the bounds of the securities
laws of the United States are completely unfettered. The only thing that was
left out was giving the SEC its own military budget. It is a very
uninternational statement. No territory of the United States is ever
mentioned. Sarbanes-Oxley is the same way. I do not think that that is
necessarily bad. What it calls on is for the regulator to do the right thing, to
see where the limitations are, and apply them.
The thing we are facing right now with Sarbanes-Oxley that is really so
difficult, is the fact that if you take General Motors who is audited right now
by Deloitte & Touche in about 50 states of the United States and 156
countries around the world. Each partnership of Deloitte & Touche that does
that is chartered in each state, and in each country. Applying the rules to each
of those foreign accountants, whether they are in Uzbekistan, China, or
Michigan is an enormous task. Sarbanes-Oxley says all of those accountants
are regulated by the SEC. All of them have to register with the SEC. All of
them have to be licensed by the new licensing board that has been created.
All of them have to agree to give their work papers to the new accounting
board and to the SEC. All of their employees who work on the audits have to
agree to come to the United States or make themselves available to testify if
there is ever a question asked. That is all pretty reasonable. If you are going
to issue securities in the United States, describe yourself to American
investors, and lie your accountants should have to come in and tell you the
truth. Sarbanes-Oxley fills a void that did not exist before the
internationalization of the markets.
I am not in favor of giving the SEC a police force or a squadron of
Marines when they come back from Iraq to go off and get these auditors in
every country. What needs to happen is for the SEC to take a page out of the
book of the past and look for the new regulator. Rather than assert their
authority, which is unfettered here, to assert agreements that get them to the
bottom of their regulatory needs. The real challenge for the regulators is to
figure out how in the near term they can structure cooperation in such a way
that it will be allowed to work.
I would note that when they had a round table last week to discuss the
international aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley, the Canadian Chartered
Accountants came forward and said they would be willing to sign the first
memorandum of understanding. Canada sits in an enormously important
position, because accountancy is relatively similarly situated despite the
cross border differences. The prospect for cooperation is great because our
legal systems, privacy laws, and Constitutional rights against
15 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881(June 6, 1934).
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self-incrimination are so similar. There is an enormous basis to do what was
done in 1988; creating a new understanding that would facilitate the
Sarbanes-Oxley law and provide a type of reciprocity on a mutual basis to
the accountants.
CONCLUSION
The last point I would make is to return to the first point I made. One of
the responses to Sarbanes-Oxley is to say all this could be fixed if we just
had one set of accounting principles, one super regulator who was taking care
of all these things. It reminds me of a visit I had right before the fall of the
Berlin Wall with the Soviet Minister of Finance. At the time he was asking a
group of us if we should we have two regulators; one for futures and one for
stocks. At that time we were having a huge fight with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission. The Chairman of the SEC shot back at him,
"You should have one regulator. There is no question, one is always better."
The Minister looked at him and said, "You know, we tried that one regulator
thing. It just does not work."
The point that I am making is that it is not a matter of consistency,
because you will never have consistency. The Spanish are going to apply the
principles differently, because they speak Spanish and because their
companies are different. The Koreans are going to do it differently. The
Americans are going to do it differently. The Australians are going to do it
differently. We should not try to make everyone the same. What we need to
do in order to protect the integrity of the American market is recognize those
differences, identifying the principles that are the foundation of that
integrity, and then give the regulators through cooperative means, the ability
to enforce them. Thank you.
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